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Essay
Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An Essay
on Vertical Restrictions and
Consumer Information
Saul Levmore*
I.

BACKGROUND: CARTELS AND FREE RIDERS

A familiar problem in the theory of antitrust law is whether the law
should allow or forbid restrictions in the distribution of a good.1 A convenient illustration concerns a manufacturer who produces blue jeans and
markets them through clothing and department stores. Should the manufacturer's refusal to deal with any retailer who sells the jeans for less than
a manufacturer-announced price violate the antitrust laws?
If the manufacturer is permitted to enforce this resale price "agreement," cartelization by the retailers may result. Any market power this
cartel may control is easily eroded by new retailers entering the market
and underselling the manufacturer-announced prices. The barriers to entry
are almost nonexistent for new retailers because consumers are willing
to shop in low-rent basements for these marvelous pants. Thus, existing
retailers need a mechanism to keep out new and lower-priced retailers.
They can enlist the manufacturer as their enforcer by indirectly paying
the manufacturer not to deal with any retailer who breaks the cartel by
selling below the manufacturer's price. In this manner, a vertical restraint
may be imposed by the manufacturer at the direction, by purchase or
coercion, of the retailers. But this retailer cartel rests on unsteady ground.
Eventually it will face competition from retailers who sell the jeans of other
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A. 1973, Columbia University; Ph.D. 1978, J.D. 1980, Yale University. The author is grateful to Stephen Bomse
for first pointing in the direction of this inquiry and to Ernest GelIhorn for his valuable
comments and criticisms.
1. The case law has moved from the Rule of Reason, in which specific facts and
markets are examined for their anticompetitive elements, to the per se illegality of vertical
restrictions, and then, at least insofar as nonprice restrictions are concerned, back to a
limited Rule of Reason. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963), and Continental T.V., Inc. v: GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977), with
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967). While this Essay
reviews the essentials of this antitrust issue, a number of seminal selections will be helpful
to the uninitiated reader. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
FixingandMarket Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Posner, The Next Step in theAntitrust Treatment of RestrictedDistribution:Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981); Telser,
Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
981
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designers. If the potential for interbrand competition is low, then the
manufacturer has monopoly power and maximizes its monopoly profits
by charging a higher than competitive price to the retailers.2 Thus, the
retailer cartel theory against allowing resale price restrictions requires the
existence of one cartel for each manufacturer or that retailers can make
3
it difficult for new manufacturers to enter the industry.
Vertical restrictions may be designed instead to form manufacturer
cartels. A number of blue jeans' producers may agree to restrict output,
but each may find it tempting to cheat on its cohorts by lowering prices
and increasing output. It is difficult for any member of this cartel to police
the agreement unless each spies upon the others' business. A more effective method of enforcing the cartel is to compare prices at the retailerlevel.
At this stage, it is easier to police pricing and output policies because the
jeans are on the shelves and price tags are easily inspected. Thus, a prospective member of the producer cartel might adopt a resale price
maintenance program-and stop dealing with any retailer who offers the
pants at a lower price-in order to meet that cartel's pricing requirements.
These producer cartels are as difficult to maintain as retailer cartels because
of the inability of any cartel member to respond to market changes.
Moreover, the manufacturer will lose the benefits that derive from various
retailers' offering different mixes of prices and services unless a multi-tier
4
resale price program is enacted.
On the other hand, vertical restrictions may be used to improve
distribution patterns and consumer awareness rather than to extract cartel
profits. A manufacturer might, for example, wish to introduce a new
washing machine with unusual features and solid construction. Although
consumers can be introduced to this new product through advertisements,
the manufacturer may discover that the qualities of the machine are better demonstrated and highlighted on the showroom floor. However, retailers
will find it profitable to use the services that are provided by competitor
retailers.' A "discounter" will tell potential customers that they should
go to a more service-oriented store to learn about various washing machines
and then return to the discounter to purchase the product. The discounter
can charge lower prices than other stores because it provides a paucity
of service, showrooms, and information. Eventually, the stores providing
these services will either stop providing the services, or worse, go out of
business. In turn, the manufacturer's attempt to introduce a different
washing machine will fail because consumers will not learn of the new
product's features and advantages.
2. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 295 (1978).

3. See Bork, supra note 1, at 405-10.
4. See id. at 411-13.
5. This exploitation of competitor retailers is the essence of the "free-rider problem." For another skeptical view, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
(2d ed 1980).

AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 586
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A vertical restriction, such as resale price maintenance, does a fairly
good job of protecting the manufacturer's and consumers' interests in introducing the new washing machine. By refusing to deal with any retailer
who sells the product for less than a price that allows for the provision
of showrooms and information, the manufacturer will rid the market of
any discounters whose free-riding strategy hampers the ultimate success
of its new product. Without price competition, remaining retailers will
compete with each other by offering greater services.
Of course, there are other ways for the manufacturer to overcome
the free-rider problem. Each of these plans, however, limits the manufacturer's flexibility and places various obstacles in the way of introducing
the new product. 6 For example, the manufacturer might do its own retailing. Although it is conceivable that such a vertically integrated enterprise
might be designed to promote a manufacturer cartel, this amalgamation
can serve to ensure that consumers receive an optimal mix of information
and demonstrations. The plan, although solving the free-rider problem,
may be unattractive to a manufacturer that knows little about retailing
or has difficulty attracting the necessary capital. In addition, a manufacturer may sense that consumers prefer to compare the machines of several
manufacturers and do not trust a salesperson who is an employee of the
manufacturer. Finally, it may be impractical for the manufacturer to pay
7
retailers according to a schedule of services provided.
6. Even resale price maintenance generates some inflexibilities in defeating the dis-

counter. The optimal marketing strategy might involve more dealer services in some
neighborhoods than in others. But resale price maintenance does not sufficiently overcome the problem posed by discounters to permit varying levels of service among dealers.
To some extent, the manufacturer will be able to mix its strategies by imposing minimum
resale prices on all dealers, but selling directly to some customers at lower prices. Still,
it is fair to note that each of these attempts by the manufacturer to overcome the discounter will incur some costs.
7. Under such a plan, the manufacturer might offer to pay SX for each showroom
and SY for each salesperson that is employed by the retailer. Similarly, the retailer could
be reimbursed for a percentage of such expenses. The impracticality of such a solution
to the free-rider problem results from the costs of enforcement. The manufacturer must
check to see that these services were provided and that they were not used to benefit the

manufacturer's competitors. It will be difficult to arrive at a schedule of subsidies that
sufficiently overcomes the free-rider problem and also does not present windfalls to the

retailer. Manufacturers might estimate the overall showroom and personnel needs for a
region and then take bids with the lower bidder earning the amount bid in return for
providing information to consumers. Such a plan might encourage competing bidders
to police the results for the manufacturer. It does not appear that this strategy has ever

been tried by a manufacturer. In any event, it is also inexact-the manufacturer must
compare bids for showrooms in good locations with bids for services in less desirable
locations-and generates a different set of problems concerning the effectiveness of competition among bidders. For example, the manufacturer must determine how to treat next
year's bids because this year's winner will have an advantage and some monopoly power

if the sale of showrooms and fixtures is required. These problems are similar to those
encountered in any plan that tries to dismantle a regulatory regime in favor of a bidding
system.
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Thus, the imposition of a vertical restriction, such as resale price
maintenance, may be economically efficient or inefficient. A restriction
may support monopolistic horizontal agreements involving retailers or producers. However, a vertical restriction that is identical in appearance may
promote the introduction of useful products that otherwise would be stifled by the free-rider problem. Some commentators hypothesize that a
distribution restriction such as resale price maintenance is much more
likely to be indicative of an attempt to overcome the free-rider problem
than it is a signal of an undesirable cartel. 8 One commentator has gone
even further by suggesting that vertical restrictions should be per se legal;
if the restrictions are harmful they ought to be dealt with by attacking
any horizontal collusion and not by destroying every vertical restriction. 9
The law once treated vertical restrictions as per se illegal and continues to do so in the case of a price restriction.10 This posture derives from
a fear that manufacturer or retailer cartels are supported and maintained
by such vertical restrictions. More recently, the legality of nonprice vertical restrictions has been determined by the Rule of Reason. I' This transformation is explained by the increasing awareness that the free-rider problem exists and may be solved by the imposition of vertical restrictions.
Thus, courts ought to weigh the benefits to consumers of the increased
services that follow a vertical restriction against the possibility that the
restriction in question is a symptom of harmful horizontal (manufacturer
or retailer) collusion. Although a vertical restriction may be a symptom
of cartelization, it is not harmful in and of itself and may be a desirable
strategy for overcoming the free-rider problem. In this last role, the vertical restriction obviates the need for manufacturers to do their own retailing, to innovate less, or to develop imperfect schemes to reimburse retailers
directly for the ancillary services and showrooms they provide.
Before evaluating the wisdom of a per se or Rule of Reason standard
in dealing with vertical restrictions, it is helpful to review the framework
in which the choice of a standard is made. To the extent that antitrust
law abhors the possibility of cartels, it has experimented with and settled
on certain rules of thumb. For example, collusive price-fixing is treated
as illegal per se, although it is unlikely that every instance of price-fixing
is undesirable. There may be some industries in which the supernormal
profits that can be earned under a price-fixing agreement would be instrumental in spurring innovation. Similarly, a collusive arrangement conceivably could yield price stability and certainty that, in turn, would encour8. See Bork, supra note 1, at 391; Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of

Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 22-23 (1981).
9. See Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 22 (1981).

10. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911);
Albrecht v, Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968).

11. See note 1 supra.
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age productive investment. Still, the exceptions to the general rule are
rare enough so that the benefits of a per se rule convincingly outweigh
its costs. Wisely, the law does not require a showing of either intentional
price-fixing or harmful collusive effects. Instead, the law judges price-fixing
to be per se illegal because the costs of demonstrating the illegal intentions of price-fixers and the harmful effects of horizontal associations exceed
the costs to society of the per se rule, including occasional price instability
and unfinanced innovations. In an analogous manner, rules of thumb do
not require a showing of intentional price-fixing, but instead are satisfied
with evidence that a number of sellers or bidders converged on similar

prices. 12
Insofar as the treatment of vertical restrictions is concerned, the danger
of horizontal arrangements must not be disregarded as soon as vertical
restrictions are recognized as potential solutions to the free-rider problem. If manufacturer or retailer cartels are genuine possibilities, then a
difficult empirical question lies behind the decision to prefer a per se rule
over a Rule of Reason. Although any horizontal agreement that lurks
beneath a harmful vertical restriction can be attacked for its illicit "horizontality," it is far more difficult to prove the existence of a collusive agreement
than it is to point to a manufacturer's insistence on a vertical restriction.
If the free-rider problem were exceedingly rare (if, for example, manufacturer advertising were as effective as retailer showrooms) and retailer cartels
were easy to maintain (perhaps significant barriers prevent new retailers
from entering certain industries), then one might actually prefer a rule
of per se illegality to the Rule of Reason. The costs of litigating and
demonstrating the existence of a cartel are substantial, but few resources
are wasted in proving a vertical restriction. While such a per se rule appears
to be overkill, its costs are small because, by assumption, manufacturers
would have almost no legitimate need for vertical restrictions.
The choice of a legal rule to deal with vertical restrictions requires
a variety of inquiries. The frequency and ultimate cost of the free-rider
problem needs to be determined. 13 The likelihood of, and losses from,
i

12. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 713-16 (1948).
13. Although vertical restrictions may be necessary to deal with many different problems, it is really the free-rider issue that is consistently at the core of the manufacturer's
objectives. It sometimes is argued that resale price maintenance helps the manufacturer
combat dealer power. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968). But this argument incorrectly assumes that a manufacturer, which once had the freedom to charge
dealers as it wished, can somehow increase its profits by forcing dealers to sell to fewer
customers at a higher retail price. See R. BOPK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 291-98 (1978).
More specifically, it might be alleged that resale price maintenance allows the manufacturer to ensure that there will be widespread availability of a product at a price that is
attractive to retailers. Similarly, it can be asserted that the manufacturer will seek to impose
advertising requirements, territorial restrictions, or repair standards on dealers to assure
adequate investment and promotion, attract dealers, or guarantee customer satisfaction.
But absent some free-rider problem, there is every reason to believe that each of these
objectives is in the interests of dealers as well as manufacturers. The dealer also will profit
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retailer and manufacturer cartels also should be examined. Finally, to the
extent that there is any likelihood of cartelization, the costs of attacking
horizontal agreements must be compared with the simplicity of exposing
vertical restrictions. The next section of this Essay focuses on applying
these criteria to the free-rider problem in the context of different types
of consumer goods.
II.

"DOWNSTREAM"

SOLUTIONS TO THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM

The real cost of the free-rider problem is indicated by the cost of the
manufacturer's next best marketing alternative. The manufacturer may
be able to retail its own goods, in which case the cost of free-riding is
measured by the manufacturer's relative disadvantage in the field of retailing. Alternatively, the manufacturer might switch to a more advertisingintensive selling strategy, in which case the cost of the free-rider problem
derives from the relative disadvantage of advertising compared with some
mix of manufacturer and retailer efforts in selling the product. The argument in favor of allowing vertical restrictions in distribution, either by
a Rule of Reason or per se legality, depicts the manufacturer as solving
its free-rider problem at the retail level. This is an "upstream" solution
in.the sense that the free-rider problem is overcome by an action farther
back on the economic chain. The problem with such an upstream solution
is that it might camouflage a manufacturer's support of a harmful horizontal
cartel.
The place of the free-rider problem in the formulation of antitrust
law is best understood by recognizing that there are alternatives to an
upstream solution. The free-rider problem can be circumvented by means
other than the manufacturer's decision to market its own products, pay
retailers for their efforts, advertise on its own, or impose vertical restrictions. A "downstream" solution must not be ignored: consumers can unite
and support independent valuations of products. Consumers who are quite
skeptical of a manufacturer that, for example, advertises that its new
washing machine can handle a variety of colors and fabrics simultaneously,
may be impressed with such a claim by Consumer Reports. Thus, the services
that retailers under provide as a consequence of the free-rider problem
can be offered separately both upstream and downstream. Commentators
who argue in favor of permitting vertical restrictions have relied on the
frequent inefficiencies of upstream solutions and either ignore or assume
other remedies for collusive arrangements supported by the allowed vertical
most when a product is optimally promoted and repaired. Instead, any genuine concern
by a manufacturer stems from an understanding that some dealers will market the product
in a sub-optimal way because that retailer will seek to take advantage of another dealer's
efforts. Clearly, if there were just one retailer for each manufacturer, the latter would
have no worries about the behavior of the former and would have no need to second guess
the retailer by imposing vertical restrictions. Rather, problems arise when there is more
than one retailer and each may try to exploit it competitors' services, leaving the manufacturer with an overall level of services that is unsatisfactory.

HeinOnline -- 67 Iowa L. Rev. 986 1981-1982

ANTITRUST LAW

restrictions. But the argument in favor of permitting vertical restrictions
misses the potential of downstream solutions in which services absent at
the retailer level are provided by consumers, consumer-supported ventures,
or some other source that is controlled by neither manufacturer nor retailer.
Certainly, the recognition of downstream solutions to the free-rider
problem is not meant as a call for an immediate return to a standard of
per se illegality for vertical restrictions. Moreover, the theoretical availability
of downstream solutions does not imply that all manufacturers will be as
satisfied with such solutions to the free-rider problem as they might be
with upstream strategies. But recognition of downstream options is important in any case in which the downstream solution ought not to be terribly unattractive to a manufacturer and the danger of a restrictive cartel
is formidable.
It is useful, then, to identify the conditions under which downstream
solutions thrive. In analyzing a vertical restriction, a court then will be
able to compare the likelihood of cartelization to the severity of the freerider problem. The latter is great when it is difficult for the manufacturer
itself to contract around the free-rider problem and when downstream solutions are least viable. In sum, vertical restrictions are appealing when both
upstream and downstream solutions to the free-rider problem are
unattractive.
The markets for washing machines and audio equipment appear to
offer examples in which vertical restrictions should be scrutinized with
some care. In neither of these markets do manufacturers or retailers enjoy
obvious cartel power. But in applying the Rule of Reason, the inquiry
must be extended to pursue consideration of the free-rider problem; a vertical restriction should be tolerated if it is the only workable solution. Unlike
many other products, such as suitcases or clocks, washers and stereos are
sold better when offered with information and demonstrations regarding
their novel features. To the extent that this information can be provided
in the retailer's showroom, it is easily appropriated and undermined by
a free-riding discounter. Although at this point in the inquiry vertical restrictions concerning washers or stereos appear to be efficient remedies to the
free-rider problem, Rule-of-Reason analysis must consider downstream
alternatives. In fact, a consumer magazine or independent testing board
actually may solve the manufacturer's marketing problem as successfully
as the imposition of a vertical restriction. Such "downstream informers"
can test various washers and stereos and then report their results to the
consuming public. Manufacturers' needs often can be filled as well by
a combination of discounting retailers and downstream informers as by
retailers that both sell goods and provide information in one location. In
some cases downstream informers may be more efficient providers of
information. 14 A dealer's showroom normally houses one or two acoustical
14. If the downstream solution in this form really improves on the vertical restriction,
then manufacturers would already know this and the marketplace, rather than an antitrust
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settings and provides less information about the equipment's performance
in the buyer's living room than might a downstream informer's study that
compares audio systems in a variety of environments. Similarly, few consumers will have the time or personality to bring their dirty laundry to
a showroom for a test run, but a downstream informer easily can report
the performance of a machine armed with a given detergent. 15
On the other hand, some product characteristics are difficult to describe
downstream. For example, consumers may want to judge whether a potential acquisition will fit in with the decor of their living rooms. In many
cases an independent test will be inadequate because the consumer requires
some personal experience with the product. For example, magazine evaluations frequently indicate that buttons and dials are difficult to locate or
that seatbelts are uncomfortable. Many buyers will learn that these factors are a function of one's personal taste or height. But this shortcoming
of downstream evaluations does not necessarily indicate that a vertical
restriction is the only remaining solution to the free-rider problem. Rather,
it may indicate that some combination of downstream and nonvertical
upstream actions is appropriate. The inadequacy of downstream evaluations may be remedied by fewer showrooms or salespeople than were
required by a strategy relying entirely on retailers or the manufacturer
itself for information. It now may be quite easy for the manufacturer to
provide such information or pay retailers directly to maintain a limited
number of samples for visual inspection.
Other products, however, such as blue jeans, are far less susceptible
to downstream solutions. The consumer's primary need is for a dressing
room and mirror in order to examine fit and style. Some consumers may
want the advice of sales personnel, which is hardly provided.in magazine
reports. In applying the Rule of Reason, courts must recognize that for
goods requiring the personal experience and evaluation of buyers, vertical restrictions deserve more deference because the free-rider problem is
quite serious. If nonrestrictive upstream solutions are unavailable, perhaps
because the manufacturer has no talent for retailing or monitoring, then
a vertical restriction should be permitted unless sufficient market power
exists to indicate camouflaged cartelization. Clearly, the market for blue
jeans is less susceptible to a downstream solution than is the market for
washers or stereos. This difference must be recognized in applying the
Rule of Reason.

rule, would accomplish the desired result. The text's optimism foreshadows the discussion
in part III in which subsidies to the downstream informers are proposed as a way of helping
these downstream alternatives overcome their own free-rider problems.
15. Somewhat farther downstream, consumers occasionally can experiment with different brands. A consumer might experiment with a neighbor's washer, television,
automobile, or television antenna. Manufacturers are cognizant of these demonstrations
beyond the showroom; for example, automobiles are sold at lower prices to rental car
companies, partly because these companies, in passing, provide test-driving opportunities.
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III.

EXPANDED DOWNSTREAM SOLUTIONS

A.

Return Policies

The importance of solutions to the free-rider problem that avoid problematical vertical restrictions requires an inquiry into other available solutions. The most striking solution lies farthest downstream, altogether
avoiding the midstream retailer. Through a mix of warranty and refund
policies, a manufacturer may enable consumers to experience products
in their intended settings, while preserving return rights. 16 To be sure,
any such policy is impractical for a product such as an automobile, which
is expensive to ship and typically available with so many options that a
generous return policy creates a tremendous inventory problem.-On the
other hand, book clubs and some mail-order companies regularly market
products in this returnable fashion by offsetting their shipping expenses
and interest costs (while the product is out for inspection) with the savings that accrue from eliminating retailers.
It is tempting to assert that this direct marketing option is a feasible
downstream solution for products of relatively low value (thus avoiding
high interest costs) and low shipping costs. Although the Rule of Reason
should recognize these distinctions among products, it is important to
recognize that this "returnable" solution to the free-rider problem has
not reached its potential. When a product is of relatively high value, the
manufacturer may hesitate to bypass the free-rider problem with this
"returnable" strategy because the manufacturer's capital is tied up in
the product and interest income is forgone. This interest cost, however,
can be shared by the manufacturer and potential consumer or be absorbed
entirely by the latter. Such an option is chosen already by some sellers
who ask for prepayment before shipping a product. Under this plan, the
consumer bears the interest cost while reviewing the product's qualities.
Other sellers ask for a deposit, in which case the interest cost is shared
by the seller and buyer. Similarly, there are some circumstances in which
consumers pay for shipping ("handling costs") and prepay for the product,
but retain the right to return the good for a full refund of the product's
price. But, for some consumers, the costs of shipping and repacking that
are encountered may often exceed the costs of showrooms and retail
relationships.
16. The terminology in the text does not imply any important difference between returns
and warranties. As far as the free-rider problem is concerned, the two serve the same
purpose. A warranty refers to the consumer's right to a refund if the product does not
conform to a set of explicit and implicit promises about its characteristics. A liberal return
policy is realty nothing more than a warranty with a boundless list of promises, or simply
a promise of customer satisfaction. The contract normally sets up a procedure for dealing
with returns and complaints after the product has been used or otherwise diminished in

value. For example, tire manufacturers promise long periods of satisfaction, but then
measure tread wear in order to discount the refund amount. None of these variations
on an absolute refund policy interfere with its role as a solution to the free-rider problem.
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What is less apparent about an expanded "returnable" strategy is
that it discriminates among consumers more than a retailer-based strategy
does and that this discrimination may be quite efficient. 1 7 A retailer's costs
generally are spread among all consumers. Under a vertical restriction,
such as resale price maintenance, the retailer is forced to charge each consumer the same price for a given product. In fact, some consumers will
subsidize the needs of others. Some buyers may experiment with different
display models and test the product as much as possible in the showroom.
Other buyers will not use much of the salespeople's time and do very little product testing. Yet, under a resale price maintenance program both
types of buyers will pay the same price. The vertical restriction will raise
the price of the goods beyond what some buyers are willing to pay,
although the buyers are perfectly willing to pay more than the cost of
production. 8 Presumably, a more flexible plan, dealing with the free-rider
problem at the midstream level of the retailer, would be too expensive
to administer and police. 1 9 The "returnable" strategy, however, allows
17. For a thorough review of the effect of price discrimination on efficiency and income

distribution, see F.

SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-

319-25 (2d ed. 1980).
18. This restates the proposition that vertical restrictions are inflexible. See note 6 supra
and accompanying text.
One last attractive feature about these downstream solutions is that they avoid a still
different free-rider problem. As a manufacturer tries to fashion an upstream solution or
as retailers provide services under an allowable vertical restriction, there is the danger
that one brand will get a free ride from the information provided about another brand.
For example, one tire manufacturer may let another educate consumers about the advantage of radial construction and then take a free ride. Thus, even if vertical restrictions
are to be per se legal, information will be undersupplied. The downstream solution offered
by independent informers does not suffer from this imperfection, as long as one informer
tests a variety of products and consumers are not asked to pay for general information
when inquiring about a specific brand.
19. This comparison is best viewed as concerning the alternative methods for selling
information to potential consumers. A vertical restriction, such as resale price maintenance
or exclusive territorial assignments, eliminates price competition among retailers; the
manufacturer expects that remaining retailers will encourage sales by providing nonexploitable information about the manufacturer's product. Generally, this approach yields
a given amount of information; a higher resale price, for example, is likely to stimulate
still more retailer-provided information (and lower sales).
A more "flexible plan" for the offering of information, see note 6 supra, attempts to
respond to the varying informational needs of customers. No sale need be lost as a result
of the higher price that accompanies a vertical restriction because consumers pay separately
for information and products. In the extreme case, one consumer can buy a product,
unseen, at a low price while another buys the product and pays hourly fees for showroom
visits. As noted earlier, this sort of plan is better than a vertical restriction to the extent
that separating information from products permits sensitivity to consumer demands. But
it is far inferior to a vertical restriction to the extent that it generates formidable transacting costs.
Finally, as discussed in the text, a "returnable" strategy may be responsive to individual consumers' demands and, therefore, provide considerable flexibility because consumers will bear at least some shipping and interest costs. If these costs exceed the value
FORMANCE
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discrimination among buyers, at least to the extent that shipping companies vary their rates according to distance. The Alaskan buyer who compares six brands of washers over a period of two weeks will pay for those
shopping tastes in the form of deposits and shipping costs that will not
be borne by the less particular consumer who lives at dockside. This result
is more efficient because buyers command resources according to their
willingness to pay.
The attraction of the "returnable" strategy should not cloud the infeasibility of this solution to the free-rider problem. Some buyers may have
difficulty meeting shipping schedules. Rising energy costs may make individual deliveries unjustifiable. The important point is that courts need
to evaluate a variety of downstream alternatives to retailer services, including independent informers and liberal return and warranty policies.
B.

Downstream Informers

The ability of traditional downstream informers, such as Consumer
Reports, to solve the free-rider problem requires an investigation into the
economic base and limitations of these institutions. Ironically, it would
not be surprising if a different free-rider problem defeated this solution
to the retailer-level free-rider problem. For example, if the downstream
information is supported by magazine sales, it is in the interest of each
user to wait for someone else to pay for the information and then to use
the neighbor's or library's subscription. Some downstream information,
such as that concerned with stock market trends, is apparently so sensitive to the passage of time that interested consumers feel compelled to
subscribe rather than share newsletters over the weekend. But few consumers are in a rush to buy televisions and washers. It seems that the
number of customers who prefer to have the information in hand is sufficient to support a number of downstream informers. For a few goods,
such as automobiles and restaurant meals, the number of downstream
evaluators is substantial. If the downstream free-rider problem could be
overcome by having each consumer pay for each iota of information
received, there surely would be far more downstream informers. To the
extent that more competition among downstream informers would stimulate
demand for an industry's output as a whole or for a particular manufacturer's product, one might expect manufacturers to avoid the midstream
free-rider problem, not only by paying retailers for particular services, but
also by paying downstream informers to judge the various products and
report their results.
A manufacturer with something unique to offer may realize that conof the information obtained, then, of course, this strategy will be unsuccessful, for con-

sumers wU1 not inspect the goods as offered. But to the extent that the transacting costs
of the "returnable" or "flexible plan" are less than the value of the obtained information
to consumers, either of these plans can be more efficient than a vertical restriction, which
by itself makes no attempt to differentiate among consumers' demands for information.
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sumers will be skeptical about claims and evaluations that emanate from
the manufacturer and may, therefore, be willing to pay other parties to
discover this information and relay it to potential consumers. A familiar
example of this phenomenon concerns the practices of some publishers,
theaters, and restaurants in supplying free products to reviewers. In some
cases the seller can vary its product over the range of customers, and
a purposefully supplied sample is less reliable than one that is anonymously
purchased. 20 The underlying point, of course, is that any concern with
the free-rider problem at the retailer level and any preference for vertical
restrictions logically ought to be matched by concern for the free-rider
problem among consumers farther downstream. Restrictions at this level
could amount to censorship, such as forbidden library acquisitions, and
would seem to be entirely inappropriate. 21 On the other hand, the possibility
of taxing or otherwise encouraging manufacturers or consumers to finance
independent evaluations of products should not be dismissed. Unless the
few downstream informers supported by subscribers somehow provide sufficient information compared with the amount that would be produced
in the absence of this downstream free-rider problem, the market may
require some corrective intervention. In other areas, however, such as
the rating of corporate bonds, the free-rider problem is less severe because
timeliness is more critical and customers have some difficulty identifying
one another; but the free-rider problem remains severe in the case of information about less time-sensitive goods.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The literature and cases dealing with vertical restrictions in distribution have concentrated on the free-rider potential among retailers. In the
absence of a vertical restriction such as resale price maintenance or territorial exclusivity, a dealer can sell to customers who have taken advantage of a competitor's services and information. But the law equivocates
in approving these vertical restrictions, however useful they may be in
solving the free-rider problem, because they may support manufacturer
or retailer cartels.
20. That many downstream informers, such as car magazines and travel agents, review

free samples does not necessarily taint their conclusions. In some cases the evaluator gets
free samples from competing producers and is not, therefore, immediately beholden to
any one provider. Moreover, many of these sellers cannot vary their products and provide particularly good ones to reviewers. This is especially true of mass-produced goods
and of services that can be widely observed by an evaluator regardless of the quality of

the individualized service received from the attentive producer.
21. To some extent, the law already deals with this downstream free-rider problem
by forbidding manufacturers to advertise the ratings that have been earned in Consumer
Reports. On the other hand, restaurants regularly post the best reviews in their windows.
Even if the manufacturer or seller is completely stopped from appropriating the downstream
informer's findings so that some consumers must buy the test results themselves, consumers can still free-ride on libraries' and each other's subscriptions.
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Commentators have noted both the difficulty inherent in maintaining a cartel and the need to solve the free-rider problem. A standard has
been proposed under which vertical restrictions actually would be per se
legal; cartels would be attacked on the basis of their illegal horizontal
arrangements rather than by mere identification of ambiguous vertical
restrictions. But it is difficult and costly to identify collusive horizontal
agreements. Moreover, these commentators have missed the potential of
"downstream" solutions to the free-rider problem they seek to solve.
At a less theoretical level, the issues discussed in this Essay bear on
current antitrust law. Courts continue to treat resale price maintenance
as per se illegal and other vertical restrictions as governed by the Rule
of Reason. Many commentators have argued for an end to this distinction and urged judicial deference to manufacturers' marketing strategies.
The discussion in this Essay has indicated that it would be most appropriate
for the courts to begin with a more accepting treatment of restrictions
that concern products least susceptible to downstream solutions. In these
cases it is most likely that a vertical restriction, including resale price
maintenance, is necessary to overcome the free-rider problem at the retailer
level.
This Essay has identified a variety of solutions to the free-rider problem. The success of any one of these obviates the need to permit vertical
restrictions. In the face of free riders, the manufacturer itself may be able
to provide information or contract directly for retailer services. Most important, insofar as some products are concerned, there may be workable
downstream solutions to the free-rider problem; independent testing institutions may produce superior information. Manufacturers may be able
to avoid retailers entirely by allowing consumers to inspect the product
and return the good if not satisfied; the marketing decision then concerns
the allocation of interest and shipping costs.
Examination of these downstream alternatives reveals novel issues.
On the positive side, a downstream solution may discriminate among purchasers more efficiently than retailer-provided services. On the other hand,
some downstream solutions may suffer from a unique free-rider problem
that derives from the public-good quality of information. The Rule of
Reason needs to be applied within a framework that reflects the various
downstream solutions. The free-rider problem can be solved in a surprising variety of ways and a fair inquiry should consider the alternatives before
sanctioning one ambiguous solution.

HeinOnline -- 67 Iowa L. Rev. 993 1981-1982

HeinOnline -- 67 Iowa L. Rev. 994 1981-1982

